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ABSTRACT
THE IMPRESSION FORMATION PROCESSES OF ASYMMETRICALLY
DEPENDENT INDIVIDUALS
MAY 1993
LAURA E. STEVENS, B.A., ALLEGHENY COLLEGE
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor Susan T. Fiske
Two studies were performed in order to address the impression
formation processes dependent people in asymmetrical relationships use
to form impressions of the powerful other. The first study investigated
the relationship between non-dependent, asymmetrically dependent, and
symmetncally dependent individuals. It was hypothesized that compared
to non-dependent and symmetrically dependent subjects, task
asymmetrically subjects would use accuracy-oriented processes and
individuate the other person. The second study investigated non-
dependent and evaluatively dependent individuals. It was hypothesized
that evaluatively dependent subjects would inaccurately, selectively
encode information about the other person in order to make the other
seem more positive. The hypotheses were confirmed. Impression
formation processes, prediction, control, and threats to self-esteem are
discussed.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Interdependence theory was first proposed by Thibaut and Kelley in
1959. Since then, it has influenced a wide variety of research in
social psychology. Research on topics ranging from bargaining and
negotiation to threat and trust have all incorporated some aspects of
interdependence theory (Chadwick-Jones, 1983). Given the explosion of
social cognitive work in the last decade or more, it is odd that
interdependence theory has not appeared in that context. One specific
social cognitive theory that has drawn on interdependence theory is
Fiske and Neuberg's (1990) continuum theory of impression formation. In
its discussion of motives, this theory utilizes many ideas originally
discussed in the context of interdependence theory (see Riley & Fiske,
1991 for a review). While interdependence theory has addressed both
symmetrical and asymmetrical dependence (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959; see
also Kelley, 1979; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978), the interdependence-related
research on impression formation has dealt with only symmetrical
dependence. Although some of the research on symmetrical dependence
could be generalized to asymmetrical dependence, asymmetrical dependence
is actually quite different and should be considered separately.
Asymmetrical Dependence
Dependence refers to the degree that an individual's outcomes
depend on another person's actions. Thus, dependence reflects how much
control one person has over another person's outcomes. Dependence is
symmetrical when the control each person has over the other's outcomes
is reciprocal. Each person can control the other's outcomes
equally.
On the other hand, dependence becomes asymmetrical as outcome
control
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becomes non-reciprocal. One individual can control the other's
outcomes, but the other person is not capable of returning that control.
The discrepancy in the power to control outcomes that
characterizes asymmetrically dependent dyads leads to two possible
perspectives. Asymmetrical relationships could be examined through the
eyes of the powerful person who has the ability to control. Or, the
relationship could be approached from the perspective of the powerless
person who does not have the ability to control. The perspective of the
powerful person has been addressed elsewhere (Goodwin & Fiske, 1993).
The perspective of the powerless member of the asymmetrically dependent
dyad will be addressed here.
By the definition stated earlier, the powerless in asymmetrically
dependent dyads do not have much ability to control the outcomes of the
powerful on whom their outcomes depend. Thus, the powerless experience
a tremendous loss of control over their own outcomes. According to
Kelly's (1963) theory of personality, all individuals are motivated to
predict and control their own outcomes. In addition, it has been argued
that control over one's circumstances is integral to the self-concept
(Depret & Fiske, in press). Given this, the powerless would be
motivated to find a way in which to cope with their lack of control.
If the asymmetrical dependence itself could not be directly
challenged, the powerless would most likely try to gain indirect control
over their outcomes. This would require the powerless to be able to
predict and control the behavior of the powerful. In order to do this,
the powerless would have to seek out information and form an impression
of the powerful
.
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Impression Formation
Fiske and Neuberg's (1990) continuum model of impression formation
posits that category-based processes of impression formation are the
default, but people shift toward more individuating processes of
impression formation when they are motivated to do so (see also Brewer,
1988). These individuating processes are characterized by an increased
use of attribute information.
Research on impression formation has shown that this shift toward
the individuating processes of impression formation does occur under
conditions of symmetrical dependence (Berscheid, Graziano, Monson, &
Dermer, 1976; Erber & Fiske, 1984; Neuberg & Fiske, 1987; Ruscher &
Fiske, 1990; Ruscher, Fiske, Miki, & Van Manen, 1991). The impression
formation processes of symmetrically dependent individuals are
characterized by increases in attention to the other person's
attributes. By attending to the other person, potentially individuating
information is readily available. Symmetrically dependent individuals
are then able to base their impressions on this individuating
information rather than only on pre-existing stereotypes and
expectancies (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Fiske & Pavelchak, 1986). On the
other hand, when people are not dependent on one another, impressions
are often based on pre-existing stereotypes and expectancies.
Because perceivers do subscribe to pre-existing stereotypes and
expectancies, any attribute information they later encounter can be
classified as consistent, inconsistent, or irrelevant with regard to
these pre-existing beliefs. Consistent information is largely redundant
with a pre-existing belief and offers little new information. On the
other hand, inconsistent information provides novel information about
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the target person's dispositions, intentions, or future behavior. Thus,
accuracy-oriented perceivers may prefer inconsistent to consistent
information because it is more informative about the target person. In
fact, studies on cooperative and competitive symmetrical dependence
found that interdependent and non-interdependent individuals paid equal
attention to expectancy-consistent information, but interdependent
individuals paid significantly more attention to expectancy-inconsistent
information (Erber & Fiske, 1984; Ruscher & Fiske, 1990). Moreover,
accuracy instructions have the same impact as symmetrical outcome
dependence (Neuberg & Fiske, 1987).
In addition, many studies have shown that inconsistent information
requires more time to encode than consistent information (e.g.. Brewer,
Dull, & Lui, 1981; Hemsley & Marmurek, 1982). This may be due to the
fact that perceivers are trying to make sense of the inconsistent
information. For example, they may be linking inconsistencies to
attributes already in memory (Srull & Wyer, 1989). Moreover, some
researchers argue that symmetrically dependent perceivers may be
spending their time making dispositional inferences (Berscheid et al.,
1976; Erber & Fiske, 1984; Ruscher & Fiske, 1990). The inconsistent
information does not fit the perceivers' expectancy. Thus, the
perceivers may attribute the inconsistent information to individual
personality idiosyncracies (Jones & Davis, 1965). These idiosyncracies
can later be used to help predict the target person's behavior.
Thus, in symmetrical dependence conditions, where each person's
outcomes are partially controlled by the other person, individuals pay
particular attention to expectancy-inconsistent attributes about the
other person. This expectancy-inconsistent information is potentially
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more informative than expectancy-consistent information. These
individuating processes of impression formation would allow
symmetrically dependent individuals to gain a greater sense of
prediction and control over their outcomes.
Impression Formation and Asymmetrical Interdependence
Analogously to symmetrically dependent individuals, asymmetrically
dependent individuals do not have complete control over their outcomes.
Therefore, it seems natural to assume that asymmetrically dependent
individuals would utilize individuating processes of impression
formation in the same kind of attempt to gain some control over their
outcomes. In fact, there is evidence to support this hypothesis.
Subjects in two recent studies by Depret and Fiske (1993) believed
they would be asymmetrically dependent on a group of three other people.
This group of three was described as heterogenous or homogenous. The
heterogeneous group was predicted to elicit the same processes as
individual outcome dependence. Since this paper deals with individual
outcome dependence, only the results for the heterogeneous group will be
presented here. The groups were described as either low power, would
have minimal control over the subject's outcomes, or high power, would
have maximal control over the subject's outcomes. While subjects in
both the low and high power heterogenous groups spent about equal time
on expectancy-consistent information about a target group member,
subjects in the high power heterogenous group spent more time on
expectancy-inconsistent information than subjects in the low power
heterogenous group. In addition, subjects in the high power condition
made more dispositional inferences about the target than subjects in the
low power condition. Overall, these results are very similar to
the
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individuating impression formation processes used by symmetrically
dependent individuals.
Stevens and Fiske (1992) conducted a preliminary study which
concentrated solely on individual asymmetrical outcome dependence.
Subjects were either not dependent on the other or they were
asymmetrically dependent on the other. While the asymmetrically
dependent subjects tended to spend more time overall on the information
about the other (M=76.55) than did non-dependent subjects (M=69.20),
F(l,50)=2.99, fi=.09, they did not distinguish between expectancy-
consistent and expectancy-inconsistent information (although standard
stimuli were used and freshly pretested). Asymmetrically dependent
subjects did make more dispositional comments (M=4.00) than did non-
dependent subjects (M=2.45), F(l,50)=5.74, fi<.05, but, again, they did
not distinguish between expectancy-consistent and expectancy-
inconsistent information.
The three studies reviewed above suggest that, compared to non-
dependent individuals, asymmetrically dependent individuals will engage
in individuating processes of impression formation that are similar to
those used by symmetrically dependent individuals. However, there do
appear to be some differences in these processes.
Individuating processes of impression formation may allow
symmetrically dependent individuals to gain a good deal of control over
their outcomes, but would individuating processes also allow
asymmetrically dependent individuals to regain all of their lost
control? Asymmetrical dependence is not reciprocal. Unlike a member o
a symmetrically dependent dyad, a powerless person cannot influence
the
powerful person's outcomes to any degree. Thus, it seems that
the
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powerless person in an asymmetrically dependent situation would have
less control than a person in a symmetrically dependent situation. This
additional loss of control should motivate the powerless to be extremely
accurate about the person on whom they are asymmetrically dependent.
Thus, asymmetrically dependent subjects may be more accurate than
symmetrically interdependent subjects.
The critical issue is how this increase in accuracy motivation
would differentiate symmetrically and asymmetrically dependent subjects.
Findings from research on symmetrical dependence seem to shed some light
on this issue (Ruscher & Fiske, 1990; Ruscher, et al., 1991). Both the
think-aloud protocols of subjects and the variability of their responses
suggest that some people discount the inconsistent information (which
seems not to be a fully accuracy-oriented process because they are not
using all the available information) while some people do incorporate
all the information (which seems to be a more accuracy-oriented process
because they are using all the available information). In an effort to
be accurate, subjects may accept all of the information they receive
about the powerful target as valid and use all of it. By disagreeing
with or making an excuse for a piece of information, subjects are
discounting the information. Thus, in an attempt to regain prediction
and control, asymmetrically dependent subjects should process
information accurately and should not discount the information they
receive about the powerful other person. Asymmetrically dependent
subjects should do this more than not dependent or symmetrically
dependent subjects.
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Impression Formation and Asymmetrical Dependence on an Evaluator
While people are often in asymmetrically dependent relationships
like those described above, a more common type of asymmetrical
dependence is asymmetrical dependence on someone who is evaluating your
performance. Evaluative dependence is quite different from asymmetrical
dependence related to concrete outcomes. Not only does an evaluator
have control over the dependent person's tangible outcomes, but an
evaluator also provides information regarding the dependent person's
competence at a task. Thus, an evaluator evokes some threat to the
dependent person's self-esteem. So, dependent people not only rely on
an evaluator for their task outcomes, but they also rely on an evaluator
for information relevant to self-esteem. Because these evaluatively
dependent people have more at stake (self-esteem in addition to tangible
outcomes) than purely outcome asymmetrically dependent people, they may
have even less of a sense of prediction and control.
Interestingly, Swann (Swann, 1990; Swann, Stein-Seroussi , &
Giesler, 1992) has shown that people have mixed motives when it comes to
self-perception. They are motivated both to be accurate about their
traits and to maintain their self-esteem. Although there is no evidence
addressing this point yet, it is probably true that these same mixed
motives would be evident in people's perception of others who have
control over the them. Evaluatively dependent perceivers should seek
information about the evaluator, yet they should also monitor the
information in an attempt to maintain their self-esteem. The most
effective way to protect one's self-esteem may be to picture the
powerful other as competent; someone who is fair, predictable, and
consistent.
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Kunda and Sanitioso (1989; see also Kunda, 1987) have proposed and
supported the idea that motivation may cause changes in people's
temporary self-conceptions by guiding people's memory searches and
leading only to the activation of self-conceptions that are consistent
with the currently desired view of the self. Analogously, in an attempt
to maintain their self-esteem, dependent people may engage in similar
kinds of changes in their conceptions of a powerful other who has some
impact on their feelings of self-worth. These changes may be
accomplished via motivated biases in the search through information
about the powerful other. In other words, evaluatively dependent
perceivers would search for positive information about the evaluator.
In fact, Pepitone (1950) found distortions in a positive direction in
subjects who were evaluatively dependent on a group of others.
Klein and Kunda (1992) have proposed that people who are motivated
to hold certain beliefs about others attempt to construct rational
justifications for their desired beliefs. Thus, when confronted with
negative information about their evaluator, evaluatively dependent
people may attempt to discount that information in order to justify
their positive beliefs about the evaluator.
A preliminary study on evaluatively dependent individuals
conducted by Stevens and Fiske (1991) provides evidence on this point.
An expectancy (positive, negative) by information consistency
(consistent, inconsistent) interaction indicated that evaluatively
dependent subjects in the positive expectancy condition spent more time
on expectancy-inconsistent information (the negative information) than
on expectancy-consistent information. Subjects in the negative
expectancy condition spent more time on expectancy-consistent
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information (also the negative information) than on expectancy-
inconsistent information. Overall, subjects spent more time on negative
information (M=78.72) than positive information {M=69.88),
F(l,79)=22.18, B<.0001. While initially this may seem to contradict the
prediction that evaluatively dependent people would search for positive
information about the evaluator, further inspection indicates it does
not. A similar interaction revealed that subjects were discounting the
negative information (M=1.97) much more than the positive information
(M=0.19), F(l,79)=48.72, fi<.0001. So, the increased time spent on
negative information was used to construct justification for the
subjects' otherwise positive view of the evaluator. Unfortunately, this
study did not have a non-dependent control condition with which to
compare.
Summary
In summary, symmetrically and asymmetrically dependent individuals
should form impressions in different ways. To begin, symmetrically
dependent people have lost some control over their own outcomes, but
they have also retained some control over the other person (i.e., the
symmetrical nature of the dependence allows the dependent person to
influence the other person's outcomes as much as the other person
influences the dependent person's). Therefore, it would be useful for
symmetrically dependent people to accurately process information about
the other person in an attempt to predict the other person's behavior.
Of course, symmetrically dependent people do not need to be extremely
accurate, although they can be, because they also have the means with
which to directly influence the other person's behavior.
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On the other hand, asymmetrically dependent individuals have lost
some control over their own outcomes, but they have not retained any
control over the other person (i.e., the asymmetrical nature of the
dependence dictates that the dependent person cannot affect the powerful
person's outcomes in any major way). Thus, asymmetrically dependent
people should be motivated to process information about the powerful
person extremely accurately in an attempt to successfully predict the
powerful person's behavior. They do not have any other guaranteed means
of control
.
Finally, like asymmetrically dependent people, evaluatively
dependent individuals also have lost some control over their outcomes
without retaining control over the other person. In addition, they have
lost some control over their self-esteem because they are subjected to
the evaluation of their performance, and competence is a central aspect
of self-esteem. While evaluatively dependent people could be motivated
to be accurate in order to predict the other's evaluative behavior, the
personal threat is greater than for the other two types of dependence.
Therefore, evaluatively dependent people may interpret information about
the other person in a self-protective manner and conclude that a
seemingly incompetent other person is in fact competent because an
incompetent evaluator is threatening; an incompetent evaluator could be
unfair, inconsistent, wrong, and therefore unpredictable.
Two studies were performed in order to address the above
hypotheses regarding how the dependent person in an asymmetrical
relationship forms an impression of the powerful other. The first study
investigated the relationship between non-dependent, asymmetrically
11
dependent, and symmetrically dependent individuals. The second study
concentrated on non-dependent and evaluatively dependent individuals.
12
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CHAPTER 2
EXPERIMENT 1
Method
Overview
An experimenter led subjects to believe that they would be working
with a fictitious other subject on a task. In addition, the
experimenter told the subjects they would be eligible for a prize based
on (a) their individual performance (no dependence), (b) their joint
performance with the fictitious subject who had already been paid a set
fee for participating (asymmetrical dependence), or (c) their joint
performance with the fictitious subject who also would be eligible for a
prize based on their joint performance (symmetrical dependence). The
fictitious subject was initially portrayed as competent (positive
expectation) or incompetent (negative expectation). Subjects then
received both expectancy-consistent and expectancy-inconsistent
information about the fictitious subject and voiced their reactions to
that information into a tape recorder. This created a three-way design
with two between-subjects variables (dependence and expectation) and one
within-subject variable (information consistency). We expected
asymmetrically dependent subjects to use accuracy-oriented processes and
to individuate the other person. In other words, compared to non-
dependent subjects, asymmetrically dependent subjects should spend more
time attending to the inconsistent information, just as do symmetrically
dependent subjects. In addition, because asymmetrically dependent
subjects are so strongly motivated to be accurate, they will discount
the information less often than the other subjects.
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Subjects
Ninety-two (65 females and 27 males) introductory psychology
students from the University of Massachusetts at Amherst received extra
credit for their participation. Subjects were randomly assigned to one
of the six conditions created by the between-subjects variables. One
subject's data were deleted due to experimenter error. In addition, the
data of two subjects who volunteered suspicion about the alleged other
subject, two subjects who understood English poorly, and 10 subjects who
were more than two and a half standard deviations above the median on
the critical variable of attention time were deleted from the
analyses.' This left 77 subjects, 25-27 in each cell of the critical
two-way interaction between dependence (a between-subjects variable) and
information consistency (the within-subject variable). Positivity of
expectancy was included as a counterbalancing variable to unconfound
consistency and positivity.
Procedure
When subjects arrived, the experimenter explained that the person
with whom they would be working was a non-student volunteer who had an
opportunity to earn some money by participating in the study. This
alleged person, always the same sex as the subject, was working on the
preliminary stages of the experiment in another room with another
experimenter. There were seven wind-up toys, paper, pen, and pencil on
the table that would presumably be used for the task.
The experimenter briefly explained that the researchers were
looking at how people work together on a creative task. So, later in
the study, the experimenter would ask them to think up educational
games
for 8 year-olds using the wind-up toys. For example, subtraction
could
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be shown by winding up a toy and letting it hop away from the remaining
toys. While explaining the task, the experimenter tried to convey that
skill and creativity would be helpful. The subject and the volunteer
were to think of ideas alone at first. In the second step, they would
work together. Supposedly, the experimenter would be comparing people's
performance alone versus their performance together.
Subjects then performed a bogus creativity task. They had two
minutes in which to generate as many words as they could using the
letters from larger words. The task supposedly warmed up the subjects
for the later task. However, the true purpose of this activity was to
give subjects positive feedback and to boost their feeling of
competence. This was done because previous research (Ruscher & Fiske,
1990) has shown that subjects low in self-perceived competence respond
differently than do subjects high in self-perceived competence.
Dependency Manipulation
The experimenter then informed subjects that, as extra incentive
and in an effort to make things similar for them and the volunteers,
they would also have an opportunity to earn some money. In the no-
dependence condition, the volunteer received $10 merely for
participating, and the subjects were eligible for one of three $50
prizes for the most creative ideas based on their performance alone, in
the first phase of the study. In the asymmetrical -dependence condition,
the volunteer received $10 merely for participating, and the subjects
were eligible for one of three $50 prizes based on their performance
with their partner in the second phase of the study. In the
symmetrical -dependence condition, the volunteer and the subjects were
jointly eligible for one of six $50 prizes (three for volunteers and
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three for students) for the most creative ideas based on their
performance with their partner in the second phase of the study.
Subjects signed a form indicating that they understood how the prizes
would be awarded.
Expectancy Manipulation
The experimenter then told subjects that the researchers were also
interested in whether subjects knowing something about the person with
whom they worked would affect performance. Due to time constraints, the
subjects would receive information about their volunteer partners, but
volunteer subjects would not receive information about the student
subjects. The experimenter allegedly had some background information
about the volunteer partners available from a pre-testing session and
would not have to take additional time gathering the information.
Supposedly, complex statistical analyses made it possible to look at how
information affected only one person in a two-person pair.
After this explanation, subjects received a summary report on the
volunteer. The summary report listed the volunteer's high school grade
point average and scores on a number of creativity and skill tests. One
version of the summary report portrayed a competent person (positive
expectation) and the other portrayed an incompetent person (negative
expectation). Subjects looked over this summary sheet while the
experimenter went down the hall allegedly to pick up some additional
information from the volunteer.
Consistency of Information Manipulation
After the experimenter returned, the subjects were asked to go
through the information that the volunteer had supposedly given the
experimenter to supplement the test scores. The experimenter told the
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subjects that their initial reactions to this information was of
interest to the researchers. Thus, they would like to record their
reactions on an audiotape. After reassuring subjects of the anonymity
of their responses, especially with respect to the fictitious other
person, the experiment asked subjects to read each piece of information
aloud and to comment about it.
This information consisted of ten sentences the volunteer had
supposedly written. Five of the sentences were consistent with
competence and inconsistent with incompetence. The other five sentences
were consistent with incompetence and inconsistent with competence.
These statements, which were based on statements used in previous
research (Ruscher, 1991), were pretested (see Appendix A) and are
available in Appendix B. The sentences appeared in a different random
order for each subject, with the stipulation that no more than two
competency or two incompetency statements appeared consecutively.
When subjects finished commenting on the information about the
volunteer, they completed a short questionnaire (see Appendix C) . On
11-point bipolar scales, subjects rated how competent, likable, and good
at the task the fictitious volunteer was. In addition, subjects rated
their own competency at the task, their perceived control, and how happy
they were with their partner. Subjects also rated how much their
individual and their joint performance would affect the distribution of
the prizes. Finally, subjects rated the consistency, clarity, and
positivity of their impression of the fictitious other person. A second
part of the questionnaire asked subjects to recall the purpose of the
experiment and comment on the study so far. Once this questionnaire
was
completed, the experimenter probed subjects for suspicion and debriefed
17
them. A random drawing for the three $50 prizes was held when the study
was completed.
Data from protocols. From the audiotapes, the experimenter
recorded the number of seconds subjects considered each piece of
information. The experimenter was blind to condition. Timing always
commenced when subjects began to read each statement. Subjects' tape-
recorded comments were then coded into discrete categories (see Table
1). In addition, because of the specific hypotheses here, the comments
were also coded for discounting. To assess reliability of the coding
scheme, another individual, who was also blind to condition, coded a
random third of the protocols; 809 comments were used to assess
reliability of the coding scheme. Cohen's kappa coefficients were
computed for each code type are as follows: dispositions, k=.84;
elaborations, k=.81; evaluations, k=.94; hedging, k=.98; attribute
matching, k=.72; repetitions, k=.79; self-reference, k=.88; no comment,
k=1.00; and discounting, k=.80 (median k=.84).
Results
Manipulation Checks
An aggregate measure of subjects' perceptions of the fictitious
other's positivity was computed from five items on the questionnaire:
competence of the other, likability of the other, how well the other
would do on the task, positivity of subjects' impressions of the other,
and how happy the subjects were having the other as their partner. As
expected, subjects in the competent expectancy condition rated the othe
person more positively (M=8.61) than did subjects in the incompetent
expectancy condition (M=6.84), F(l,71)=34.15, £<.0001.
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Further, as expected, there was a main effect for dependence on
the questionnaire measure of how much the joint performance of the
subject and the fictitious other would affect the distribution of the
prizes, F(2,71)=5.03, £<.01. An a priori contrast indicated that
subjects in the non-dependence condition rated the influence of their
joint performance significantly lower (M=5.82) than subjects in the
asymmetrical and symmetrical dependence conditions (Ms=8.04 and 7.92,
respectively), F(l,75)=10.02, fi<.01. This accurately reflects the
instructions these subjects were given. It also indicates that subjects
perceived the reward contingencies for the asymmetrical and symmetrical
dependence situations as similar.
Timed Attention
The total number of seconds subjects attended to attribute
information was entered into a 2X2X2 mixed-model analysis of variance
(ANOVA) : Dependence (none, asymmetrical, symmetrical) X Expectation
(positive, negative) X Information Consistency (expectancy-consistent,
expectancy-inconsistent). This analysis yielded the predicted
dependence by information consistency interaction, F(2,71)=3.99, £<.05,
indicating that attention to inconsistent information increased from no
(M=74.19) to asymmetrical (M=77.01) to symmetrical (M=77.78) dependence
and that attention to consistent information decreased from no (M=78.96)
to asymmetrical (M=76.51) to symmetrical (M=74.93) dependence (see
Figure 1). An a priori contrast indicated that, compared to subjects in
the no-dependence condition, subjects in the symmetrical -dependence
condition spent more time on inconsistent than consistent information,
F(l,75)=3.99, £<.05. A test of the residual was not significant, F<1,
indicating that the interaction was linear. Subjects in the
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asymmetrical
-dependence condition spent about equal time on inconsistent
and consistent information.
Think-aloud Protocols
For each comment type described in Table 1 that accounted for more
than 10% of the total comments made, the number of such comments served
as the dependent variable entered into a 2X2X2 mixed-model ANOVA, using
the independent variables noted above.
Discounting . As originally predicted, the ANOVA yielded a main
effect for dependence. Asymmetrically dependent subjects discounted the
information the least (M=1.13), while symmetrically dependent subjects
and non-dependent subjects discounted the information more often
(Ms=2.06 and 2.36, respectively), F(2,71)=3.45, £<.05. An a priori
contrast provided further support that asymmetrically dependent subjects
discounted the information less often than the other subjects,
F(l,75)=6.43, fi<.05.
Two higher order effects were also present. A two-way interaction
between expectancy and consistency indicated that negative expectancy
subjects discounted consistent information more than inconsistent and
that positive expectancy subjects discounted inconsistent information
more than consistent F(l,71)=81.27, e<.0001. In other words, negative
information was discounted more often (M=2.92) than positive information
(M=0.83). Thus, it seems subjects attempted to make their partner
appear positive. People would prefer to work with people they find
competent than people they find incompetent. In addition, a three-way
interaction among dependence, expectancy, and consistency reflected the
combined influence of the two other significant effects, F(2,71)=4.61,
£<.05. While all subjects discounted negative information more than
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positive, the asymmetrically dependent subjects discounted both the
negative (M=1.69) and positive information (M=0.56) less than the not
dependent (negative M=3.74 and positive M=0.09) or symmetrically
dependent subjects (negative M=3.21 and positive M=0.91).
Other Comments. A two-way interaction between expectancy and
consistency indicated that negative expectancy subjects were more likely
to make dispositional comments about inconsistent information and
positive expectancy subjects were more likely to make dispositional
comments about consistent information, F(l,71)=36.42, b<.0001. So, more
dispositional comments were made about positive information (M=5.35)
than negative information (M=3.78). Once again, subjects were more
likely to attribute positive than negative attributes to their partner's
disposition.
All subjects made more elaborations about negative information
(M=4.39) than positive information (M=2.94), as indicated by another
two-way interaction between expectancy and consistency, F(l,71)=18.93,
£<.0001. Many of these elaborations about negative information were
elaborations that discounted the negative information. Again, subjects
tried to make their partner appear a competent other.
In addition, a two-way interaction between expectancy and
information indicated that subjects hedged more often on negative
information (M=4.83) than positive information (M=4.08), F(l,71)=9.77,
£<.01. Once again, the subjects seemed uncomfortable with the negative
information.^
Consistency
Finally, a contrast indicated that asymmetrically dependent
subjects (M=5.36) tended to rate the information as less consistent than
21
the other subjects (not dependent M=6.78 and symmetrically dependent
M=6.52), F(l,75)=3.46, £=.07. This seems to demonstrate that
asymmetrical subjects recognized the actual variability of the comments
more accurately than other subjects.
Summary and Conclusions
As anticipated, relative to non-dependent subjects, asymmetrically
dependent subjects increased their attention to expectancy-inconsistent
information, just as do symmetrically dependent subjects. In addition,
attention to expectancy-consistent information decreased from no to
asymmetrical to symmetrical dependence conditions. In addition,
asymmetrically dependent subjects discounted the information less often
than the other subjects. Thus, the behavior of the subjects
substantiates the hypothesis that asymmetrically dependent subjects
would be motivated to use accuracy-oriented processes and to individuate
the other person in an attempt to regain lost prediction and control.
Furthermore, it seemed as though all subjects wanted to view the
other person in a positive light. They discounted, elaborated, and
hedged about the negative information, while they made dispositional
attributions about the positive information. This natural tendency to
want to view a partner as competent rather than incompetent may have
been motivated by the subjects' drive to maintain their self-esteem. An
incompetent partner may be somewhat threatening to self-esteem.
Both the motivation to seek information about and to be positive
about the other may grow stronger with additional losses to peoples'
prediction and control. Evaluatively dependent individuals lose
prediction and control over their outcomes and, to a greater
degree than
asymmetrically dependent individuals, over their sense of
self-esteem.
22
Thus, evaluatively dependent individuals would probably be strongly
motivated to interpret information about the powerful other on whom
depend in a positive manner. The next study addresses this point.
23
Table 1. Content Categories for Subjects' Comments
about Target Information
Category Explanation
Disposition
Elaboration
Evaluation
Hedging
Attribute
Repetition
Self-reference
No comment
Discounting
Inference about target's traits, tendencies, likes.
Interpretation of what the information means or
impl ies.
Evaluation without interpretation.
Comment not directed at anything in particular. A
pause filled with "well uh."
Attempt to match information to prior knowledge of
target.
Verbatim or paraphrased restatement.
Self-comparison, reference to self, opinions.
No comment made or subject says "no comment."
Changing the valence of the information or making an
excuse for it.
24
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CHAPTER 3
EXPERIMENT 2
Method
Overview
An experimenter led subjects to believe that their performance
would (asymmetrical evaluative dependence) or would not (no dependence)
be evaluated by a fictitious other, whom they expected to meet. In
addition, the experimenter told the subjects they would be eligible for
a prize based on the evaluation of their performance. The fictitious
subject was initially portrayed as competent (positive expectation) or
incompetent (negative expectation)^. Subjects then received both
positive and negative (expectancy-consistent and expectancy-
inconsistent) information about the fictitious subject and voiced their
reactions to that information into a tape recorder. This created a
three-way design with two between-subjects variables (dependence and
expectation) and one within-subject variable (consistency of
information). We expected evaluatively dependent subjects to
inaccurately, selectively encode information about the other person in
order to make the other person seem more positive. In other words,
evaluatively dependent subjects should discount the negative information
more than non-dependent subjects.
Subjects
Fifty-three (35 females and 18 males) introductory psychology
students from the University of Massachusetts at Amherst received extra
credit for their participation. Subjects were randomly assigned to one
of the four conditions created by the between-subjects variables. The
data of two subjects who volunteered suspicion about the alleged other
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subject, three subjects who understood English poorly, and three
subjects who were more than two and a half standard deviations above the
median on the critical variable of attention time were deleted from the
analyses.* This left 45 subjects, 22-23 in each cell of the critical
two-way interaction between dependence (a between-subjects variable) and
consistency of information (the within-subject variable). Positivity of
expectancy was included as a counterbalancing variable to unconfound
consistency and positivity.
Procedure
When subjects arrived, the experimenter explained that a work-
study undergraduate was also participating in the study. ^ This alleged
person, always the same sex as the subject, was waiting in another room.
There were seven wind-up toys, paper, pen, and pencil on the table that
would presumably be needed for the task.
The experimenter briefly explained that the researchers were
looking at how discussion affects performance on a creative task. So,
later in the study, the experimenter would ask them to think up ways to
communicate concepts using the wind-up toys. For instance, subtraction
could be shown by winding up a toy and letting it hop away from the
remaining toys. Supposedly, the experimenter would be comparing the
performance of two groups of subjects--one group of people who discuss
their ideas and another group of people who do not discuss their ideas.
Thus, some people in the study would be having a discussion with the
fictitious other person and other subjects would not.
Subjects then performed the bogus creativity task used earlier,
supposedly to get warmed up for the later task. However, as in the
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first study, the true purpose of this activity was to give subjects
positive feedback and to boost their feeling of competence.
Dependency Manipulation
The experimenter then told the subjects that they happened to be
in the condition of the study where they would have the discussion with
the fictitious other person. In fact, all of the subjects were in this
"condition."
The experimenter proceeded to inform subjects that, supposedly as
a way to thank subjects for their time and effort, a number of $20
prizes^ would be distributed for the most creative ideas. In the no-
dependence condition, the research supervisor would be awarding the
prizes. In the evaluative-dependence condition, the fictitious other
person with whom the subjects would be discussing their ideas would be
awarding the prizes. Subjects signed a form indicating that they
understood how the prizes would be awarded.
Expectancy Manipulation
The experimenter then told subjects that, in an effort to make the
study more like a real -life work situation, they would be receiving some
information about the person with whom they would be discussing their
ideas. The first piece of information would be a brief statement
written by the other person explaining how well this person expected to
do in the discussion. This statement served to manipulate subjects'
expectancy for the other person. The competent expectancy statement
read: "To be honest, I think I might be pretty good at this. I've been
a teaching assistant for several semesters now and I've done pretty
well, especially with things like this." The incompetent expectancy
statement read: "To be honest, I'm not sure if I'll be any
good at
28
this. I was a teaching assistant last semester, but I didn't to so
great, especially with things like this."
Consistency of Information Manipulation
After the subjects read this statement, the experimenter explained
that the next bit of information would be ten comments taken from an
informal evaluation of the person when that person was a teaching
assistant. The experimenter also explained that this was the first time
information from a teaching evaluation had been used in a study. Thus,
the researchers were interested in subjects' reactions to the
information and would like to record their initial responses to it on an
audiotape. After reassuring subjects of the anonymity of their
responses, especially with respect to the fictitious other person, the
experiment asked subjects to read each piece of information aloud and to
comment about it.
This information was mixed. Five of the sentences were consistent
with the positive expectancy (competence) and the other five sentences
were consistent with the negative expectancy (incompetence). These
statements, which were based on statements used in previous research
(Erber & Fiske, 1984; Ruscher & Fiske, 1990). were pretested (see
Appendix D) and are available in Appendix E. The sentences appeared in
a different random order for each subject, with the stipulation that no
more than two positive or two negative statements appeared
consecutively.
When subjects finished commenting on the information about the
volunteer, they completed a short questionnaire (see Appendix F). On
nine-point bipolar scales, subjects rated how competent, likable, and
good at the discussion the fictitious other was. In addition,
subjects
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rated their own competency at the task and their perceived control. A
second part of the questionnaire asked subjects to recall the purpose of
the experiment and comment on the study so far. Once this questionnaire
was completed, the experimenter probed subjects for suspicion and
debriefed them. A random drawing for the three $20 prizes was held when
the study was completed.
Data from protocols
. Attention and comments were assessed as
before. To assess reliability, a second individual coded a random third
of the protocols; 597 comments were used to assess reliability of the
coding scheme. Cohen's kappa coefficients were computed for each code
type are as follows: dispositions, k=.81; elaborations, k=.84;
evaluations, k=.82; hedging, k=.98; attribute matching, k=.78;
repetitions, k=.66; self-reference, k=1.00; no comment, k=1.00; and
discounting, k=.85 (median k=.84).
Results
Manipulation Checks
A measure of subjects' perception of how well the fictitious other
expected to do in the discussion indicated that the expectancy
manipulation worked. Subjects in the positive expectancy condition
expected the other person to do better in the discussion (M=7.64) than
subjects in the negative expectancy condition (M=4.78), F(l,41)=57.22,
£<.0001.
Further, there was a main effect for dependence on the
questionnaire measure of how much control the other person had over
whether the subject won the prize, F(2,41)=75.40, fi<.0001. Subjects who
were not dependent indicated that the other person had less control
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(M=2.64) than subjects who were evaluatively dependent {M=7.18). This
accurately reflects the instructions these subjects were given.
Timed Attention
The total number of seconds subjects attended to attribute
information was entered into a 2X2X2 mixed-model analysis of variance
(ANOVA): Dependence (none, evaluative) X Expectation (positive,
negative) X Information Consistency (positive, negative). This analysis
yielded only one significant effect: an interaction between expectancy
and consistency of information, F(l,41)=19.58, £<.001, indicating that
subjects in the positive expectancy condition spent more time on
inconsistent information than consistent information and that subjects
in the negative expectancy condition spent more time on consistent
information than inconsistent information. Overall, all subjects spent
more time on negative (M=79.75) than positive information (M=70.45).
This is not unusual. A great deal of person perception research has
indicated that, in general, negative information is considered more
informative than positive information (see Skowronski & Carlston, 1989).
Think-aloud Protocols
For each comment type described in Table 1 that accounted for more
than 10% of the total comments made, the number of such comments served
as the dependent variable entered into a 2X2X2 mixed-model ANOVA, using
the independent variables noted above.
Discounting . As predicted, the ANOVA yielded a two-way
interaction between expectancy and consistency similar to the
interaction on timed attention, F(l,41)=19.81, fi<.001. It indicated
that subjects discounted negative information (M=2.56) more often than
positive information (M=0.067). In addition, a three-way interaction
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among expectancy, dependence, and consistency, F(l,41)=4.05, e=.05,
indicated that, while both non-dependent and evaluatively dependent
subjects discounted more negative (M=1.41 and M=3.70, respectively) than
positive (M=0.045 and M=0.087, respectively) information, this
difference was much larger for evaluatively dependent subjects (see
Figure 2).' There was also a main effect for dependence, F(l,41)=4.41,
£<.05. Overall, evaluatively dependent subjects discounted the
information more (M=1.89) than non-dependent subjects (M=0.73). As
hypothesized, this may have been in an effort to interpret the
information about the evaluator in a positive manner.
Other Comments
. The only other significant effects for the
comments were interactions between expectancy and consistency. These
interactions were similar to the two presented above for timed attention
and discounting. As above, here they are presented in terms of
information valence rather than consistency. More dispositional
comments were made about the positive information (M=4.62) than the
negative information (M=2.47), F(l,41)=34.16, fi<.0001. More
elaborations were made about negative information (M=5.22) than positive
information (M=4.24), F(l,41)=4.88, £<.05. More evaluative comments
were made about positive information (M=1.47) than negative information
(M=l.ll), F(l,41)=5.05, £<.05. Finally, more hedges were made about
negative information (M=5.78) than positive information (M=4.38),
F(l,41)=22.03, £<.0001. As in Experiment 1, these findings seem to
indicate that subjects preferred to view the other person in a positive
rather than a negative manner. While they discounted, elaborated, and
hedged about the negative information, they preferred to make
dispositional inferences and comment on the valence of the positive
32
comments. The subjects seemed more comfortable with the positive
aspects of the other.
Inaccuracy
While subjects accurately indicated that the fictitious other
person in the positive expectancy condition would do better in the
discussion than the fictitious other person in the negative expectancy
condition as described in the manipulation check section above, there
were other inaccuracies on this measure. Overall, evaluatively
dependent subjects thought the other person would do better in the
discussion (M=7.00) than did non-dependent subjects (M=5.64),
F(l,41)=11.14, fi<.01. A two-way interaction between dependence and
expectancy. F(l,41)=7.13, fi<.05 (see Figure 3), indicated that both non-
dependent and evaluatively dependent subjects in the positive expectancy
condition accurately perceived the other's competence and rated it high
(M=7.73 and M=8.0, respectively). However, in the negative expectancy
condition, only the non-dependent subjects recognized the other person's
incompetence (M=3.55). The evaluatively dependent subjects rated the
incompetent other as fairly competent (M=6.0). Thus, the evaluatively
dependent subjects inaccurate perception of the other person's
competence in the negative expectancy condition drove the main effect
for dependence.
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CHAPTER 4
DISCUSSION
The results of these two experiments suggest that task dependent
and evaluatively dependent individuals process information about
powerful others in two different ways. Task dependent individuals are
motivated to attend to information both inconsistent and consistent with
initial expectations about the powerful other. The decrease in
attention to consistent information relative to non-dependent
individuals is interesting because it indicates that less expectancy
confirming processing is occurring. The increase in attention to
inconsistent information relative to non-dependent individuals is of
particular interest because it is a necessary condition for more
individuating processes. Moreover, these individuating processes of
impression formation are particularly accuracy-oriented, and all the
information is considered equally. Task dependent individuals discount
the information less often than either non-dependent or symmetrically
dependent individuals. These results largely confirm the original
predictions.
On the other hand, evaluatively dependent individuals work with
information about the powerful other quite differently. They are not
particularly concerned with information consistent or inconsistent with
prior expectancies. Instead, they spend most of their effort on any
negative information that is available. Evaluatively dependent
individuals discount this negative information and are motivated to form
a positive impression of the powerful other. Again, the original
predictions were largely confirmed.
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Issues of Prediction and Control
The different processes of impression formation used by task and
evaluatively dependent individuals seem to be a consequence of different
levels of prediction and control. Neither is exactly like those
processes found under conditions of symmetrical dependence.
Asymmetrical dependence is characterized by less control than
symmetrical dependence. Asymmetrically dependent individuals, by
definition, have no control over the other's outcomes. Yet, conditions
of task dependence do give the dependent person an opportunity to work
with the powerful other. Thus, the powerless person could gain some
control over outcomes by influencing the powerful other. However, there
is no guarantee that the powerful other would be receptive to this
influence. Therefore, it is in the powerless person's best interest to
have accurate information about the powerful person in order to predict
behavior. This accurate information provides the powerless person with
some sense of control or at least prediction over outcomes.
In the evaluatively dependent case, the powerless person not only
loses prediction and control over outcomes, but also over self-esteem
maintenance. The evaluator has the ability to give negative feedback.
This threat to self-esteem, not just to tangible outcomes, motivates the
powerless to view the evaluator in positive manner. A competent
evaluator would be less likely to threaten the powerless person's
feelings of self-worth than a incompetent evaluator. Thus, in an
attempt to regain prediction and control over self-esteem, the powerless
are motivated to use inaccurate processes of impression formation and to
engage in wishful thinking.
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Impression Formation
According to Fiske and Neuberg's (1990) continuum model of
impression formation, people shift toward more individuating processes
only when they are motivated to do so. Research has shown that this
shift toward the individuating processes of impression formation does
occur under conditions of symmetrical dependence (Berscheid et al.,
1976; Erber & Fiske, 1984; Neuberg & Fiske, 1987; Ruscher & Fiske, 1990;
Ruscher et al., 1991). Experiment 1 provides evidence that task
asymmetrically dependent individuals are also motivated to shift toward
the individuating processes of impression formation. In fact, they seem
to use even more accuracy-oriented processes than symmetrically
dependent individuals. Alternatively, the absence of an increase in
timed attention in Experiment 2 indicates that evaluatively dependent
individuals do not use quite as many individuating processes. Yet, they
do think about the information differently than non-dependent subjects.
They are motivated to think wishfully about the powerful other.
Interestingly, unlike the findings in previous research on
symmetrical dependency (Fiske & Pavelchak, 1986; Ruscher & Fiske, 1990;
Ruscher et al., 1991), these studies did not show an increase in
dispositional inferences about inconsistent information. However, both
studies did show an increase in dispositional inferences about positive
information, which may indicate that asymmetrical dependence has strong
implications for subjects' self-esteem. Therefore, they attempted to
view the powerful other in a positive manner by making dispositional
inferences about the positive information.
It would be interesting to be able to make more powerful
comparisons between the cases of task and evaluative dependence.
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Unfortunately, these two conditions were not included in the same study.
This semester a study including both cases will be conducted.
Impression formation in conditions of asymmetrical dependence are
currently being studied. This research on the powerless person in
asymmetrical dyads, Goodwin and Fiske's research on the powerful person
in asymmetrical dyads, and Depret and Fiske's research on the powerless
in asymmetrical groups has worked to fill the gap. As a result, we are
better able to understand how people cope in unequal power
relationships.
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APPENDIX A
PRETEST CONSISTENCY RATINGS OF STIMULI FOR EXPERIMENT 1
Sentence
Negative Positive
Expectation Expectation F(l,27) El
Intel 1 igent 2.9 9.2 52.37 .0001
Thorough 3.7 8.7 33.27 .0001
Disciplined 4.1 8.8 33.56 .0001
Conscientious 3.7 8.1 27.01 .0001
Motivated 3.3 8.9 61.53 .0001
Irresponsible 8.8 4.1 39.27 .0001
Vague 7.9 4.0 25.43 .0001
Inefficient 7.5 3.8 19.18 .0005
Nitpicking 7.5 5.1 8.02 .01
Sloppy 7.9 4.2 30.29 .0001
Measured on an 11-point scale (l=completely inconsistent, ll=completely
consistent)
.
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APPENDIX B
STIMULI FOR EXPERIMENT 1
Information cons istent with positive expectancy
E.G. thinks that I am intelligent because I got good grades in hi
school
.
G.M. thinks that I am thorough because I do a lot of research on my
projects.
J.L. thinks that I am disciplined because I focus on what needs to be
done and am not easily distracted.
B.H. thinks that I am conscientious because I always worry about getting
my work done on time.
S.V. thinks that I am motivated because I often start work early or work
through my lunch hour.
Information consistent with negative expectancy
E.D. thinks that I am irresponsible because I don't always follow
through on all my projects.
L.G. thinks that I am vague because he says I never explain my ideas
clearly.
S.P. thinks that I am inefficient because I don't work as fast as she
does.
B.M. thinks that I am nitpicking because I usually don't let people
forget when they make a mistake.
L.R. thinks that I am sloppy because I don't keep my files in order.
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APPENDIX C
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR EXPERIMENT 1
Part I
Your responses are completely confidential. Please be honest.
1. Please list some personality traits you think characterize this
person.
2. You have received some information about the person with whom you
will be working in a few minutes. Do you think this information will be
useful for your interaction with this person?
1 23456789 10 11
very very
useless useful
3. In general, how competent do you think the person with whom you'll
be working is?
1 23456789 10 11
very very
incom- com-
petent petent
4. In general, how likable do you think the person with whom you'll be
working is?
1 23456789 10 11
very very
unlik- lik-
able ^ble
5. How well do you think you will do in this study?123456789 10 11
very very
poorly w^l^
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T
6. How well do you think the person with whom you'll be working will doin this study? a «123456789 10 11
very
poorly
^^^y
7. How much impact will your individual performance (i.e., your
performance alone) have on whether or not you win one of the prizes?123456789 10 11
very
very
little
n,^^ch
8. How much impact will your joint performance (i.e., your performance
with the other person) have on whether or not you win one of the prizes?123456789 10 11
very very
little much
9. How much control do you think you have over how you will do in this
study?
1 23456789 10 11
very very
little much
10. How much control do you think your partner has over how you will do
in this study?
1 23456789 10 11
very very
little much
11. How consistent or inconsistent was the information you received
about you partner?
1 23456789 10 11
very very
incon- con-
sistent sis-
tent
12. How clear or unclear is your impression of your partner?123456789 10 11
very very
unclear clear
43
13. How positive or negative is
1 2 3 4 5
very
nega-
tive
14. How happy or unhappy do you
partner?
1 2 3 4 5
very
unhappy
your impression of your partner?
6 7 8 9 10 11
very
posi-
tive
feel about having this person as your
6 7 8 9 10 11
very
happy
Part II
1. Based on what you remeinber, please briefly describe the study.
2. We are always interested in any comments, ideas, or predictions
people have about our studies. If you have any, please describe them
below.
44
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APPENDIX D
PRETEST CONSISTENCY RATINGS OF STIMULI FOR EXPERIMENT 2
Negative Positive
Sentence Expectation Expectation F(1.30) E<
CI ever 3.50 5.44 7.91 .01
Persi stence 3.38 6.56 22.64 .0001
Quickly 3.63 5.63 6.69 .05
Efficient 3.81 6.56 12.57 .005
Relaxed 3.81 6.19 12.21 .005
Irresponsi bl e 0.44 3 .05 15.63 .0005
Vague 5.69 3.69 6.91 .05
Superficial 6.00 4.13 4.75 .05
Nitpicking 5.63 4.06 4.70 .05
Sloppy 5.38 3.13 8.84 .01
Measured on a
consistent)
.
nine-point scale (l=completely inconsistent. 9=conipletely
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APPENDIX E
STIMULI FOR EXPERIMENT 2
Information con«;i stent with positive expectancy
I thought the TA sometimes had very clever answers to questions.
I thought the TA had just the right amount of persistence when trvinq to
relate an idea to the class.
I liked how quickly the TA went through the material without omitting
any important points.
The TA was efficient and usually got the homework graded way ahead of
time.
The TA appeared to be relaxed during teaching.
Information consistent with negative expectancy
From the amount of preparation and the level of organization, I would
say that the TA was an irresponsible instructor.
I thought the TA was sort of vague when explaining things.
The TA took a superficial approach to teaching, not showing a lot of
interest in the subject.
In the discussion section, the TA spent a lot of time nitpicking at
minor details.
The TA was sloppy and had illegible handwriting.
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APPENDIX F
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR EXPERIMENT 2
Part I
Your responses are completely confidential. Please be honest.
1. You have received some information about Chris, the person with whom
you will discuss your ideas. Do you think this information will be
useful for interaction later?
1 2 3
not at all
useful
2. How likable is Chris?
1 2 3
extremely
unl ikable
3. How competent is Chris?
1 2 3
very
incompetent
8
extremely
useful
8
extremely
likable
9
very
competent
4. Please list some personality traits you think characterize Chris.
5. How well do you think you will do on the upcoming task?123456789
very very
poorly well
6. How much control do you think you have over whether you win a prize
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
no control complete
at all control
?
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7. How much control do you think Chris has over whether you win a
prize? 123456789
no control complete
control
8. How well does Chris expect to do in your discussion?123456789
not very very
well well
9. How good a TA was Chris?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
not very very
good good
Part II
1. Based on what you remember from the explanation of the study, please
briefly describe the study.
2. We are always interested in any comments, ideas, or prediction
people have about our studies. If you have any, please describe them
below.
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ENDNOTES
1. Of the deleted subjects, one was in the no dependence-positive
expectancy condition, two were in the no dependence-negative expectancy
condition, four were in the asymmetrical dependence-positive expectancy
condition, two were in the asymmetrical dependence-negative expectancy
condition, four were in the symmetrical dependence-positive expectancy
condition, and two were in the symmetrical dependence-negative
expectancy condition.
2. Two other significant interaction, theoretically uninteresting, are
not discussed here. Subjects expecting an incompetent other made more
elaborations than subjects expecting a competent other, F(l,71)=9.32,
£<.01. No and asymmetrically interdependent subjects hedged more often
that symmetrically interdependent subjects, F(l,71)=3.06, £=.05.
3. Of course, competence has a different meaning in an evaluator than
in a partner. One would appreciate an extremely competent partner, but
may shy away from an evaluator who was too competent. Thus, our
competency manipulation was made a little weaker in Experiment 2.
4. Of the deleted subjects, one was in the no dependence-positive
expectancy condition, three were in the no dependence-negative
expectancy condition, two were in the evaluative dependence-positive
expectancy condition, and two were in the evaluative dependence-negative
expectancy condition.
5. We opted against using a non-student because we wanted the subjects
to believe that the same person would be evaluating all the subjects.
It was easier to convince them that a work-study student would be
available every time a subject was run than a non-student volunteer.
6. The amount of the prize was reduced in this study because a
preliminary study indicated that it took less monetary incentive to get
subjects invested in an evaluative dependence task than in an
asymmetrical dependence task.
7. For simplicity of presentation this interaction is collapsed over
consistency and expectancy. The data is presented in terms of
information valence.
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